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Between “Information” and “Inspiration”: The Office of War Information, Frank 




While there is little debate that the United States required propaganda films as part of its war 
effort in order to combat the masterful and dangerous concoctions of the Axis powers and to 
inspire its people for a war of unprecedented ferocity against an unrelenting and vicious 
enemy, how these films should be constituted, and by whom, was a matter of significant 
debate and disagreement. This chapter will address the background to the propaganda 
produced by the United States during World War II, but will interrogate and analyse perhaps 
its most famous and sophisticated expression: the Why We Fight series. Executive produced 
by prominent Hollywood director Frank Capra, the series skilfully interwove newsreel 
footage, enemy propaganda, animated maps and battlefield reportage, into a coherent, 
dynamic and highly persuasive vision of the world before, during and after World War II. 
Although Why We Fight demonises the enemy, particularly the Japanese, as malevolent, 
frightening peoples driven by a collective insanity that was created by their maniacal leaders, 
it is as much concerned with emphasising the common cause of the Allies. 
 
The picture of the United States’ propaganda operations during World War II is a complex 
one. On the one hand, there was the government’s production of films for consumption by 
civilians at home and abroad, as well as ‘orientation’ films for troops heading into battle. On 
the other, there was the government’s relationship with Hollywood and the concerted attempt 
to ensure that the film industry’s output supported the war effort. Around the fringes of these 
operations existed a palpable hesitation about the production and utilisation of propaganda 




films, and this anxiety coalesced around two factors. Firstly, the idea of propaganda – setting 
out deliberately to manipulate people through misleading, sometimes inaccurate information 
– was considered anathema to a nation proud of its democratic ideals and traditions (Koppes 
and Black 1990: 48). The United States was the only major power without an official 
propaganda agency prior to World War II. Secondly, it was widely regarded that films 
produced during World War I, particularly the popular shorts that demonised the Germans as 
‘oversized marauding ape[s] that indiscriminately kidnapped and slaughtered Belgian women 
and children’ had overstepped the mark (Geiger 2011: 125). These excesses prompted a call  
for a more streamlined and careful approach to the form during World War II, which led to 
the creation of the Office of War Information (OWI) by presidential decree in June 1942. 
 
OWI was designed, as Betsy McLane suggests, “to coordinate all government information 
released to the media and to develop its own means of informing the public” (McLane 2012: 
147). A wide variety of propaganda films were produced, aimed at audiences domestic and 
international, civilian and military. However, chaos continued to be caused by a number of 
government information divisions competing over similar territory which, taken together, 
failed to create a coherent and unified war vision. While it was accepted that “controls over 
the politic and morality of American movies were … crucial to the project of establishing 
national unity,” the relationship proceeded in a rather disorganised, ad hoc fashion (Geiger 
2011: 127). As Koppes and Black note, “propaganda policy evolved from a typically 
Rooseveltian melange of caution, indirection, duplication, half-measures and ambiguity” 
(Koppes and Black 1990: 50). OWI was meant to take charge of propaganda, but the Office 
of the Co-Ordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), devoted to operations in Latin 
America, retained its independence. OWI itself was separated into branches dealing with 
foreign and domestic affairs, with the latter branch working closely with Hollywood to 




produce pictures that would bolster the war effort. Hollywood, otherwise supportive, 
nonetheless resisted anything that would impact its business interests. As Thomas Doherty 
notes of the Washington/Hollywood relationship during the war, “the liaison […] was a 
distinctly American and democratic arrangement, a mesh of public policy and business 
enterprise” (Doherty 1991: 63). Aside from any conflict with Hollywood studios, OWI also 
faced hostile opposition from Congress which, consistent in its resistance to Roosevelt’s New 
Deal, attempted to block the unit’s funding, citing concerns regarding infringement of free 
speech. Ultimately, OWI’s Domestic Branch “never succeeded in getting a production 
programme underway,” a failure driven by a combination of a recalcitrant Congress and the 
American people’s widespread suspicion of information directed at them by the government 
(McLane 2012: 48). 
 
The confusion and apparent disorganisation of the United States’ propaganda strategy is 
indicative of a nation experiencing a profound struggle as to how it would deliver films that 
would galvanise its citizenry and inspire its troops without compromising its democratic 
ideals. The approach taken, to produce films that would celebrate Americanism rather than 
vilify its enemies, combated this anxiety: Robert Riskin’s work for the OWI’s Overseas 
Bureau, the ambitious Projections of America films (of which 26 were produced) aimed to 
challenge preconceptions of the United States in foreign territories (Scott 2008: 347). Both 
Riskin and his chief of production Phillip Dunne preferred the subtly persuasive brand of 
propaganda to the more common aggressive approach: their films were intended to generate 
sympathy for the ‘American way’, promoting free speech, free enterprise and equal 
opportunities. Films such as Valley of the Tennessee (Hammid, 1944) and The Town (von 
Sternberg, 1945) were affirmations of Americanism for foreign audiences, the former a paean 
to the ways in which “American ingenuity and the collective pioneer spirit have translated 




into social progress and personal empowerment,” the latter a reconstruction of 
Rockwellesque fantasy, an image of Middle America as “clean-cut, industrious, family-
oriented, churchgoing” (Geiger 2011: 133). In the worlds created by Riskin’s films, the post-
war landscape would be as imagined by Roosevelt’s famous “Four Freedoms” speech of 
1941: “led by the US and characterized by freedoms of speech, of religion, and of freedom 
from want and fear” (135). 
 
Similarly inspiring films were sought for American troops, ones that offered more than the 
usual training information. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the US Army, believed that 
soldiers should not just be shown how to fight, but told why this particular fight is as 
necessary: for him, “military education was never just a matter of force-fed information and 
rote recitation but of nurtured incentive and felt commitment” (Doherty 1993: 70). As 
McLane suggests, it was assumed that servicemen would be “more committed and able 
fighters if they knew about the events leading up to, and the reasons for, US participation in 
the war” (2012: 139). The OWI was careful to avoid the terms ‘indoctrination’ and 
‘propaganda’ (considered ‘un-American’), and preferred instead ‘orientation’ (ibid.) Given 
this strategy, it is perhaps unsurprising that Frank Capra was employed to produce the series. 
The films Capra directed in the preceding decade, including: Mr Deeds Goes to Town (1936), 
Mr Smith Goes to Washington (1939) and Meet John Doe (1941), are often remembered as 
shining celebrations of the United States’ democracy and economy. In truth, they are more 
complicated. In all three films, the Capra hero – the ordinary, honest, straightforward 
individual – is brought in to rescue this system from corruption and greed. In their own 
individual ways, Capra’s films can be viewed as performing acts of rescue for America’s 
democratic and economic systems in the darkest hours of the Great Depression. Meet John 
Doe, in particular, released six months prior to America’s entry in to World War II, was a 




downbeat vision of the ways in which the ‘common man’ could be overwhelmed by a society 
manipulated by a deceitful press kowtowing to corporate interests. Why We Fight would offer 
a similar impression of what life would be like if the United States did not stand up for its 
values, while simultaneously celebrating the courage and heroism of its allies and pointing 
the way to a brighter, more prosperous and peaceful future. 
 
Why We Fight was an ambitious project that, as Richard Dyer MacCann suggested, sought 
first to destroy faith in the notion that the United States could remain isolated and unaffected 
by the wars in Europe and the Far East; second, to create a clear dichotomy between the 
strong and righteous Allies and the stupid and malevolent Axis; and third, to ensure that the 
courage and success of America’s allies before December 7th, 1941 was recognised (1973: 
157). What Capra recognised from the beginning, however, was that this intention could not 
be fully realised or achieved without recourse to techniques used in drama in order to excite 
the senses, inspire and, in many cases, horrify and disgust. The dazzling array of methods 
employed, combining existing footage (newsreels, Allied and captured enemy records of 
battle, segments from fictional films, Nazi propaganda films) with animation, voiceover 
narration, music and dynamic editing, were put in service of this goal. As Doherty notes of 
the series’ style and composition, “never before had the entire panoply of cinematic devices 
been put to such concerted and seamless instructional use” (1993: 74).  
 
The series consisted of seven parts: Prelude to War (1942), The Nazis Strike (1943) and 
Divide and Conquer (1943) covered the years from the end of World War I until American 
entry into World War II, and constructed the clear dividing lines between the Allies and the 
Axis. The Battle of Britain (1943), The Battle of Russia (1943) and The Battle of China 
(1943) saw the series turn its attention to the specific campaigns fought by America’s allies, 




and looked to draw these nations together in common cause, emphasising their beliefs in 
freedom from tyranny (a debatable characterisation of the Soviet Union at the time) and their 
bravery and determination to achieve this goal. The final part, War Comes to America (1945) 
examined changing attitudes in the United States as a result of the war. In the rest of this 
chapter I will address each film in turn but retain the clear demarcation between the films that 
focus on the ‘pre-war’ phase of action and those that concentrate on the campaigns (the 
former has attracted far more critical attention than the latter). I will explore the ways in 
which the thematic drive of the series – to celebrate the values of freedom and democracy as 
simultaneously American and universal – is demonstrated and reinforced consistently through 
its use of film language. In so doing, this chapter will show how Why We Fight’s function 
was not simply to demonise the enemies of these values, but to act as a clarion call to defeat 
them and build a better world underpinned by a benign vision of Americanism.  
 
Prelude to War (1942) / The Nazis Strike (1943) / Divide and Conquer (1943) 
 
Prelude to War establishes the series’ themes, style and overall message swiftly and 
uncompromisingly. Quoting Vice President Henry Wallace, it constructs a clear dichotomy 
between ‘the free world’, a gleaming white globe of hope and optimism, and ‘the slave 
world’, a black void dominated by authoritarian regimes, violent demagogues and people 
suffering from collective insanity and mass delusion. Geiger suggests that the film “leaves 
little room for contemplation,” “disallows questioning of images” and “presents audiences 
with a simple, divided world view” (2011: 136). This is inarguable, although one might 
question why this is necessarily problematic given the intended audience of the film and its 
goals: as Joseph McBride suggests, the “‘us or them’ dialectic gave the films the emotional 
power Capra sought, simplifying the enormously complex historical and political issues 




underlying the war into a single, quickly grasped, black-and-white concept”(1992: 468). 
Capra believed that normal soldiers had little to no understanding of geopolitics and 
therefore, in order to achieve the stated aim of inspiring the troops through a clear celebration 
of Americanism and denigration of its enemies, this apparently simplistic approach was the 
only way (469). 
  
Prelude to War is very keen to emphasise the similarities and common bonds between the 
Allies despite their various differences in language, culture and systems of government and 
economy, and its internationalist approach is emphasised in the first few minutes of the film, 
which seek to historicise and explain America’s reasons for intervention not merely as a 
response to the attack on Pearl Harbor but as a result of the cumulative effect of Axis 
violence towards Britain, France, China, Czechoslovakia, Norway and Greece (to name but a 
few), achieved through a rapid montage of battlefield footage. It is underpinned by the 
greatness of the American system of government which, according to the film, represents the 
greatest that mankind has achieved, with particular significance afforded to the Declaration of 
Independence and the figures of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson and Abraham 
Lincoln. This strategy is entirely in keeping with the series’ joint goals of emphasising the 
need for international cooperation and celebrating American democratic traditions (467). 
 
Every opportunity is taken to contrast this image of tolerance, freedom and democracy with 
the frightening authoritarianism, imperialism and violence of the Axis powers. However, this 
does not automatically lead to a demonisation of the people of these nations. While there 
remains rhetoric that plays clearly on national stereotypes (‘Germans had in an inborn love of 
regimentation and harsh discipline’), great emphasis is placed on the cessation of thought in 
these countries, the film arguing that the peoples of Germany, Italy and Japan were being 




manipulated by dangerous, devious men pursuing nefarious ends. Capra’s films, particularly 
American Madness (1932) and Meet John Doe (1941), are often wary of the tendency of the 
masses to behave irrationally, abandoning their principles when threatened by insecurity and 
Prelude to War is no different. Newsreel images show huge crowds of Italians and Germans 
mindlessly saluting their Mussolini (‘an ambitious rabble rouser’) and Hitler (‘a forceful 
demagogue [who] took advantage of postwar chaos’), respectively. Particularly chilling is the 
lengthy montage of footage of children training, marching and saluting in unison in all three 
Axis countries. As James Agee notes of this sequence, it is a “virtuoso job of selection and 
cutting, and the grimmest image of fascism I have seen on a screen” (1975: 156). The 
intended meaning here is to present the German, Italian and Japanese people as victims of 
brainwashing by their leaders, striding mindlessly towards oblivion. 
 
Prelude to War establishes animation, which is employed consistently throughout the series, 
as a fundamental stylistic choice to illustrate the manipulation and imperial ambition of the 
Axis powers. Animated telegraph poles, representing the Axis’ ability to manipulate their 
populations through propaganda, transmit ‘lies, lies, lies.’ Piles of animated coins, 
representing the Nazi military budget, dominate the screen. In keeping with the dichotomy 
established by the ‘free’ and ‘slave’ world construction at the film’s beginning, maps 
illustrate the conquering of nations by subsuming them beneath a malevolent, almost 
tumorous black ink. The plan for global domination is outlined halfway through Prelude to 
War, with the final phase being the capture of the United States by Japan and Germany. If 
one of the series’ stated aims was to ‘destroy faith in isolation’, the depiction of such an 
alarming present and frightening future is likely to have played a significant part in it, 
showing the entire globe under the dominion of the swastika and the rising sun. In the final 
part of the film, which chronicles Japan’s attempt to conquer China, the campaign is 




introduced by a dagger being driven into the heart of Manchuria, preceded by a steadily rising 
drumbeat and accompanied by a clap of thunder. It is a dramatic device clearly designed to 
shake loose any lingering shards of complacency.  
 
The Nazis Strike elaborates on the relentlessness and brutality of the Nazis introduced in 
Prelude to War. Much of the film concentrates on Nazi treachery up to the formal beginning 
of World War II: the annexation of Austria, the stealthy capture of Czechoslovakia and the 
conquest of Poland. Richard Barsam argues it is “a highly charged, emotionally told history 
of the ‘maniacal will,’ the ‘madness,’ and the ‘insane passion for conquest’ of the Nazi 
leaders” (1975: 152). The film is preoccupied with establishing the Nazis as a formidable, 
malevolent and terrifying force. In keeping with this reading, it begins with footage from 
Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will (1935), which Capra described as ‘terrifying’ in his 
autobiography; “the ominous prelude of Hitler’s holocaust of hate”, but “as a psychological 
weapon aimed at destroying the will to resist, it was just as lethal” (Capra 1971: 328). The 
expressed intention behind the repurposing of this footage for American propaganda was to 
divest it of its mythological underpinning: traumatic images of the victims of Nazi violence 
are superimposed over the militaristic precision of the Nuremberg rally. The goose-stepping 
soldiers, mindlessly obeying their leader, are made to look ridiculous, undermined by music 
that would not sound out of place in a Looney Tunes cartoon. As Capra himself stated, “We 
took their own footage and tried to make it backfire on them” (quoted in Bailey 2004: 127).   
 
However, examining it closely it is clear that the film intended to construct the Nazis as an 
awesome force not to be underestimated: as Doherty notes, “the enemy soldier should be 
looked upon as a vicious gangster – skilful, dedicated, and deadly as a cobra” (1993: 75). The 
use of Triumph of the Will is intended to show the Nazis as united, disciplined and, judging 




by the ominous music that accompanies the film’s title at the beginning, a formidable foe. 
This intention is reinforced by the German-accented voiceover narration early on in the film 
that looks at the rearming process and the insane, terrifying ideology that lay behind it: 
‘forget hours, forget working conditions, forget how to think… let the democracies talk about 
freedom. No freedom here. No labour unions. No overtime. The führer tells you where to 
work, when to work, how long to work, how much your work is worth. […] We have a 
sacred mission: today we rule Germany, tomorrow the world.’ This foreboding monologue is 
followed by two rapid tracking shots of saluting Germans superimposed over one another. 
Accompanied by the repeated chant of ‘Sieg heil!’, the image is visually and aurally 
overwhelming.  
 
The tendency to present the Nazi war machine as an all-encompassing, unstoppable force 
risks painting a rather hopeless picture. The conclusion is an emotional one, designed to 
disturb and terrify: underscored by the second movement of Beethoven’s 7th Symphony, 
reported to be a favourite of Hitler’s, the consequences of Nazi violence are laid bare. The 
destruction of Poland is made manifest through the relentless rhythm of the music, its minor 
key lending it a mournful quality, and accompanying images of Polish corpses lining the 
streets, mothers weeping over dead children. The volume and timbre of the music builds to a 
crescendo, which further reinforces the overwhelming nature of Nazi devastation. Cannily, 
the film does not end here but rather with a note of hope: the British declaration of war, 
which, explored at the very end of the film, is designed to inspire, cited as evidence that ‘the 
democracies had convictions on which they were willing to stake their lives.’ The film then 
repeats some of the images of displaced, desperate, weeping Polish civilians used only 
moments prior, this time underscored both by Beethoven and Winston Churchill’s 
inspirational words: ‘Lift up your hearts, all will come right, and out of the depths of sorrow 




and of sacrifice will be born again the glory of mankind’, before a rousing chorus of ‘Onward 
Christian Soldiers’ and the Liberty Bell draws the film to its ultimate conclusion. Barsam 
suggests that this “mood of moral righteousness” detracts from the film’s effectiveness, but it 
is difficult to see how: the repetition of the footage of civilians at the film’s end allows it to 
perform the task of the series overall; to inform and inspire (1975: 152). The closing 
moments of The Nazis Strike is intended to fulfil the latter half of the bargain in explicit 
terms. 
 
Divide and Conquer is the first of the films to look in great detail at military strategy 
(although the latter part of The Nazis Strike did explore this in relation to Poland), and deals 
primarily with the Nazi conquest of Western Europe and Scandinavia, building towards The 
Battle of Britain. McLane suggests the film is akin to a classical tragedy, and the comparison 
is certainly a compelling one: the film begins with the conquering of Poland, moving through 
German strategy and Hitler’s treachery, before chronicling the speed and ruthless efficiency 
with which the German army overwhelmed Denmark and Norway, detailing French 
vulnerability to invasion, showing the swift defeats of Holland and Belgium before 
concluding, in heartbreaking fashion, with the fall of France (2012: 142). The use of combat 
footage and animation work again in conjunction to present images of Nazi power, with 
particular care taken to ensure the images, assembled from a variety of sources, appear as 
though they had originated with this production: as McLane notes, it is “almost as if all of 
this footage had been shot for these films under Capra’s or Litvak’s direction” (ibid.). The 
effect of this assembly is a sense of intensity: the rapidly edited footage of German artillery 
battering the French lines creates an unremitting din, Nazi strength further reinforced by the 
figuration of their forces as an enormous phallic arrow piercing the French lines with ease, 
which fragment and scatter in the face of this potent, ruthless barrage. 





Hitler is explicitly compared with John Dillinger, his treachery and backhandedness 
reinforced at every turn by quotations of his peaceful intentions towards these nations before 
proceeding to chronicle the brutal bombardment and cruelty towards civilians, particularly 
children (indeed, the series’ tendency to emphasise the suffering of children is amongst its 
most blunt persuasive techniques). The persuasive strategies here are similar to the previous 
two films, although it is slightly more preoccupied with the parade of Nazi ghouls and 
presenting Hitler at his most theatrical. Importantly, the voiceover narration does not 
contextualise or translate these speeches, preferring instead to allow the maniacal 
performances to speak for themselves, including a montage of unquestioning followers 
saluting their leaders. This renders the footage of Hitler striding into France to secure its 
surrender before taking a tour of Paris all the more upsetting, underscored first by stunned 
silence, and then by a mournful trumpet and drumbeat as disconsolate French citizens weep 
at their new subservience. The surrendering French are not spared any criticism, however: as 
Barsam suggests, the film presents France as “disillusioned and cynical […] weary of her 
own ideals,” almost ripe for the plucking by a force as focused and ruthless at Hitler’s (1975: 
152). It is in this instance that one could agree with McLane’s suggestion that the series was 
“admired on aesthetic and technical grounds but not for its ability to indoctrinate”, because 
Divide and Conquer presents a devastating vision of catastrophic defeat by a terrifying foe, 
but offers little in the way of inspiration (aside from a rather limp suggestion that Charles de 
Gaulle’s army-in-exile would rescue the French people in conjunction with Britain and the 








The Battle of Britain (1943) / The Battle of Russia (1943) / The Battle of China (1943) 
 
The three films chronicling the efforts of the United States’ allies up to, and immediately 
following, American entry into the war are politically interesting for a variety of reasons, not 
least because the latter two are poetic and at times beautiful celebrations of two nations that 
would quickly become enemies of the United States in the years following World War II. All 
three of these films are designed to inspire by demonstrating that, unlike the first three in the 
series, the Axis powers were beatable. Although McBride notes that the earlier films, such as 
Prelude to War, may have in fact increased the impression of the enemy’s strength by the 
soldiers watching, the battles of Britain, Russia and China all conclude with inspiring words 
from, and images of, the victorious Allies (1992: 482). 
 
The Battle of Britain is perhaps the simplest of the three films. It begins with the infamous 
footage of Hitler surveying the spoils of his French conquest, looking up at the Eiffel Tower, 
the images of the Nazi armies robotically marching through the Parisian streets underscored 
by an ominous orchestral score as attentions turn to Britain. The image of Britain the film 
offers is a familiar one: the plucky, stubborn little island in the north Atlantic that refused to 
yield to Hitler and his plans for world domination. In service of this image, the film 
consistently juxtaposes the ruthless power of the German forces with the determined British 
people, memorably figured as little Jonah about to be swallowed by the Nazi whale. The use 
of familiar British songs like ‘Land of Hope and Glory’ and ‘British Grenadier’ provide 
defiant counterpoint to the images of German bombardment, and the animations that show 
the malevolent Nazi forces scorch their way across Europe. 
 




These are the most politically significant elements of The Battle of Britain: the fearsome Nazi 
bombardment, witnessed the previous two parts of Why We Fight, is repeated here, but 
interspersed are British propaganda images to reinforce the pluck and determination in the 
face of adversity. As Dyer MacCann suggests of the film, “The outnumbered people and the 
little air force are the steady heroes of this remarkable moving picture. No thoughtful 
American could watch this dramatic and terrible story without a sense of wonder and 
gratitude that this thing could have been done on this little island in 1940” (1973: 159). In this 
regard, the film offers us romanticised images of the people of Britain: women scrubbing 
floors, serving meals, caring for children; men in pubs, tending churchyards. This ‘home 
guard’ – the clerk, the butcher, the farmer, the member of parliament – constituted the nation 
that would resist German conquest at all costs. In the absence of the right equipment, the 
British would employ ‘the weapon of spirit’. Capra’s Britain is the stuff of Ealing comedies: 
we are shown footage of resolute citizens playing harmonica in underground bomb shelters, 
making light of the persistent threat of death at the hands of German bombs, Londoners 
waking up each morning after a night of bombardment to continue life as normal, drinking 
cups of tea and comparing notes on the previous evening’s bombing, a husband and wife 
returning to their damaged home, the woman dismissing her husband’s suggestion she leave 
for safer terrain. All of these images are designed to reinforce the narrator’s suggestion that 
‘Hitler could kill them, but damned if he could lick them’, a claim further reinforced by the 
images of Brits celebrating Christmas in the middle of the Battle of Britain. The carol-
singing, when one considers the anti-religious attitudes of Nazism addressed in Prelude to 
War, becomes itself a political statement. 
 
Barsam suggests “The Battle of Russia is a tough, fast, informative film,” although it is the 
longest of the series (1975: 153). It is an emotional celebration of the nation that tore the 




heart out of the German war machine, and is rather more careful in its construction than 
Barsam’s characterisation implies. While familiarity with Britain and the British (or, at least, 
stereotypes of the nation and its people) probably negated the necessity of such a strategy in 
the series’ previous instalment, The Battle of Russia emphasises the size (‘all of North 
America and a million square miles to boot’), wealth (gold, silver, copper, tin, manganese 
and nickel), and diversity (Ukrainians, Armenians, Georgians and Laplanders, to name but a 
few) of the Soviet Union. The film makes use of other (fictional) films, particularly Sergei 
Eisenstein’s Alexander Nevsky (1938) and Vladimir Petrov’s Peter the First (1937) to 
celebrate Russian heroes, and emphasise the historical tendency for the country to be invaded 
though never conquered.  
 
What the film does not do, and scholars of Capra and of documentary have been quick to 
point this out in postwar studies of the film, is excoriate (or even mention) Soviet 
communism or authoritarianism. The absence of this criticism caused headaches for Capra 
and his production team in the anti-communist 1950s: as McBride notes, “Capra felt 
vulnerable for having made The Battle of Russia, which not only had nothing critical to say 
about the Soviet political system but even went so far as to call the Soviets a ‘free and united 
people’” (1992: 462). The cloud of suspicion that hung over the film after the war ended 
speaks far more of the atmosphere of paranoia in the United States rather than anything 
actually in (or not in) the film itself: it is indeed an insistently positive vision of Russian 
bravery in the face of what appeared inevitable defeat, and a highly selective image of its 
government and economy, but this is entirely unsurprising. Why We Fight intends to 
emphasise the similarities and continuities between the Allies, and The Battle of Russia is no 
different. As Capra himself stated (having attempted to distance himself from the production 
of the film in the immediate aftermath of the war, as discussed by McBride (1992: 486-7), 




“you understand these were our allies. We were fighting a common enemy at the time, not 
each other. Unless you get into that, you won’t understand the simplifications” (quoted in 
Bailey 2004: 126).  
 
The ‘simplifications’, as Capra describes them, are in keeping with those of the previous 
instalment, The Battle of Britain. The setpieces of the film are no doubt the siege of 
Leningrad and the battle of Stalingrad. It is in these sequences that the series’ sophisticated 
use of montage editing comes to the fore to emphasise the Russian grit and determination to 
resist the Nazi bombardment: German shelling is juxtaposed with Russian manufacturing, 
welding, smelting, producing their own weapons to counter the unrelenting volley of 
ammunition headed their way. The editing is rapid, so each German shell is swiftly followed 
by a shot of Russian military manufacturing. Significantly, the German shelling is 
impersonal, delivered by enormous guns thrust into the sky, while the film shows us Russian 
faces working at their machines, creating a sense of identification with the cause. The victory 
at Stalingrad is rendered all the more powerful by the images of the defeated Germans, who 
appear addled, exhausted, shuffling to oblivion, one soldier trudging into an icy abyss. 
 
The Battle of China, criticised by Barsam as the “weakest” of the series, does suffer from a 
trite, patronising tone, but given the fact that it was designed to be seen by American troops 
who had never been to China, nor met many of its people, this is perhaps unsurprising (1975: 
152). At the time, there was some criticism of the film from General Frederick Osborn, to 
whom Capra was answerable, because the film contained so much material taken from fiction 
film that did not depict historical events (McBride 1992: 482). Similarly, the sentimental tone 
of the film was rebuked by the War Department, to which Capra responded, “I know there are 
people […] who claim we have put too much ‘emotion’ in these films. […] But my 




experiences with audiences has [sic] long ago taught me that if you want facts to stick, you 
must present them in an interesting manner (quoted in ibid.) Like The Battle of Russia, it 
emphasises the history of the nation, its civilisation and its achievements: “an ancient culture 
[…] bigger than Europe and the United States […] never waged a war of conquest.” Again, 
like the Russians and the British, the Chinese are portrayed as a courageous and defiant 
people, who employ their ingenuity to resist their invaders and prevent their ultimate defeat. 
Indeed, the film suggests that it was the Japanese invasion that ‘created’ the Chinese nation, 
as it forced the people to band together in a show of collective solidarity. 
 
This is radically juxtaposed by the film’s representation of Japan, whose plan for world 
conquest is laid bare. The film is almost as concerned with demonising the Japanese as it is 
with celebrating China. Indeed, the film seeks to establish China and Japan as diametrically 
opposed – where China uses Western manufacturing technology to modernise its nation and 
improve the lives of its people, Japan employs this for naked military aggression. In its 
treatment of the Japanese, The Battle of China represents the closest the series comes to open 
racism, for while its attitude towards the Germans often played on national stereotypes of 
ruthless efficiency and organisation, the Japanese are characterised as ‘blood-crazed Japs’, 
dehumanised as ‘the little yellow men.’  Although the films’ previous instalments featured 
shocking footage of the German bombing of Rotterdam following the Dutch surrender and 
deeply upsetting images of dead children during the attacks on Stalingrad, the bombardment 
of Shanghai paints the Japanese as a savage, cruel people. Capra may have balked at the 
accusation of infusing his propaganda films with ‘too much emotion’ but The Battle of China 
does occasionally tip the scales of information and inspiration in favour of the latter, skating 
close to the kinds of ‘hate’ films produced in World War I that the American government 
were determined to avoid. 




Conclusion: War Comes to America (1945) 
 
The seventh and final part of Why We Fight, released just two months prior to Japan’s 
unconditional surrender, is also the least considered of the series (perhaps because of its 
proximity to the war’s end). War Comes to America provides a satisfying conclusion, 
drawing together the various strands of the conflict and presenting them entirely through the 
eyes of Americans, both soldiers and civilians. It charts the changing attitudes Americans 
took to their participation in the war, shifting from isolationism to internationalism. Like 
Capra’s fiction films, it is a celebration of Americanism, from the first few seconds where 
Old Glory, billowing proudly in the wind, is underscored by children reciting the Pledge of 
Allegiance. It makes consistent use of American imagery, particularly the Statue of Liberty, 
as symbolic of the ‘idea’ on which the nation is founded: democracy and freedom. Like the 
films about Britain, Russia and China, the film emphasises the diversity of America’s 
fighting forces (‘rich man, poor man, beggar man, thief; doctor, lawyer, merchant, chief’) 
and, as a final blow to isolationism, recalls the birth of the nation on the battlefields of the 
War of Independence. 
 
In drawing the series to a conclusion in this fashion, the film demonstrates the extent to 
which Why We Fight fulfilled the demand for a coherent and holistic chronicle of the history 
and context of the war the American government were asking its people to fight, and offers 
compelling and clear reasons for it. Doherty’s suggestion that the films speak “eloquently and 
calmly” for the hopes of a better world in the future is an instructive one, although it must be 
remembered that, as indicated by the conclusion of War Comes to America, that this future is 
linked, inextricably, with the success and vitality of American ideology. As the film series’ 
first instalment had celebrated the Declaration of Independence as a document that could 




speak for all mankind’s hopes for a better world, so the series’ concluding moments, the 
American flag billowing in the wind and the Statue of Liberty standing proud and tall, offer 
visual figuration of that which the seven films had sought to reinforce throughout: this is not 
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